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Comment
A PROCESS-BASED APPROACH TO
PRESIDENTIAL EXIT
MARK SEIDENFELD†
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Professors J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman published a
pathbreaking article: Regulatory Exit.1 That article suggests that
regulators ought to pay more attention to how regulatory programs
and relationships end, rather than just focusing on creating programs
without any thought to their termination. Furthermore, Ruhl and
Salzman identify two dimensions that characterize regulatory exit that
can help creators of regulatory programs think about how to structure
“exit.” The first is whether the criteria for exit are (or should be)
specified ex ante—when the design of the program or regulatory
interaction is established—rather than ex post—after the program is
operating and the interaction is ongoing.2 The second dimension is
whether the specification of what triggers exit should be transparent
and rule-like—depending only on the existence of clearly delineated
facts—rather than opaque or fuzzy—like flexible standards whose
operation depend on imperfectly specified balancing of a variety of
factors.3
In their contribution to this symposium on Exit and the
Administrative State, Ruhl and Salzman focus on Presidential Exit—
exit from regulatory programs created and administered by the
president without need for action by any congressionally created
administrative agency.4 Such exit is especially interesting because the
source of the president’s authority to create regulatory programs
varies: sometimes that authority is granted to the president by statute;

Copyright © 2018 Mark Seidenfeld.
† Patricia A. Dore Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
1. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2015).
2. Id. at 1312–14.
3. Id. at 1312, 1314–16.
4. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 1736–40 (2018).
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other times the president’s authority flows directly from his
constitutional powers, such as his role as commander-in-chief or his
responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully executed.5 One might
reasonably surmise that the propriety of Congress imposing exit
criteria on the president must depend on the source of the president’s
authority in that instance. Additionally, unlike the heads of
administrative agencies, the president is the embodiment of the
executive branch, and constitutionally he is coequal with the other two
branches, Congress and the courts. This too might affect the propriety
of congressionally imposed criteria for presidential exit. This Essay
comments on both of these Ruhl and Salzman articles by distinguishing
process-based constraints on exit from substantive exit criteria. This
Essay posits that, because of difficulties in specifying substantive exit
criteria that serve the goals of a regulatory program, often processbased criteria can more effectively serve such goals.
Part I addresses the general notion of regulatory exit that was the
subject of Regulatory Exit. I note that Ruhl and Salzman focus on
substantive criteria for when exit should occur. But, it is virtually
impossible to know ex ante all of the substantive criteria that should
trigger some type of exit—whether that be an end to the program, the
end of the relationship of a particular participant in the program to the
remainder of the regulated community, or more nuanced changes to
either the program or its relationship to a particular participant. For
this reason, I contend that although substantive criteria for exit may be
beneficial, process-based requirements for exit are probably more
fundamental to a vast majority of programs. Moreover, in contrast to
Ruhl and Salzman’s insight that substantive criteria for regulatory exit
generally are underspecified and not sufficiently considered, the
regulatory state nearly always provides the procedures that an agency
must follow before engaging in exit of any kind,6 and usually a process
for judicial appeal or review.7 Furthermore, such processes are usually
structured to ensure that exit is justified by either objective analyses or

5. For the purposes of this Essay, it is not important to distinguish those situations in which
Congress shares authority over a matter with the president from those in which the president has
exclusive authority. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(offering opinions of several justices on the relationship of the president’s constitutional powers
to those of Congress); see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding that the
president has exclusive power to decide whether to recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel).
6. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–557, 559 (2012).
7. Id. § 706; Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967) (stating that there is a
presumption of availability of judicial review).
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changes in the values of the polity. That is, the administrative state has
spent considerable time and effort developing policymaking processes
that essentially require agencies to lay out the implications of their exit
decisions; these processes increase the transparency of the values
furthered by the agency’s regulatory action, and thereby foster political
accountability.8
Part II turns to the particular question of presidential exit, for
which procedures are less studied and developed. I address how the
sources of presidential regulatory authority and the president’s role as
the head of a constitutionally coequal branch of government explain
the dearth of process-based prerequisites to presidential exit. Finally, I
appeal to deliberative democracy’s justification for the administrative
state to suggest that the public interest might be well served by
subjecting presidential regulatory decisions to judicial review,
requiring the president to explain why he believes these actions
promote the public interest. Throughout this Essay, I use President
Trump’s efforts to exit President Obama’s Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy to illustrate how process-based
criteria that govern regulatory change can meaningfully constrain
agency and presidential decisions to exit from preexisting regulatory
policies.
I. PROCESSES FOR REGULATORY EXIT
It is helpful to carefully define Ruhl and Salzman’s concept of
regulatory exit in order to identify the processes that law mandates an
agency follow before engaging in such exit. They define exit broadly as
“the intentional, significant reduction in governmental intervention
initiated at a particular time under specified processes and
conditions.”9 Ruhl and Salzman then go on to state that, from the
perspective of the administrative agency, exit may be the elimination
of a program in its entirety, or it may be relaxation of “a regulatory
threshold defining the class of regulated entities . . . or [reduction of]
the intensity of permitting standards and procedures . . . as is done
through the general permit mechanism.”10 Exit may also reflect a
determination that an entity subject to regulation has met some
threshold that removes it from regulatory oversight.
8. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 162, 194–97 (2012).
9. Ruhl & Salzman, Regulatory Exit, supra note 1, at 1302.
10. Id.
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Of course, regulatory exit requires a preexisting regulatory
relationship with private entities. Hence, exit can be seen as part of the
general concept of administration action. “Entrance” creates the
relationship and “exit” reduces or eliminates it. Ruhl and Salzman’s
contribution to this symposium, Presidential Exit, clarifies that exit
from one policy is really the imposition of a substitute policy. For
example, President Obama maintained DACA as a policy that created
enforcement priorities that essentially guaranteed that noncitizen
residents of the United States who had entered the country prior to
their sixteenth birthday and remained without proper immigration
documentation would not be deported, and would instead be able to
obtain work permits allowing them to work legally in the United States.
When President Trump’s acting secretary of homeland security
reversed the Obama administration’s DACA policy,11 so-called
dreamers exited the DACA program and entered into a different and
more invasive relationship with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.12 Thus, there often is no clear distinction between exit of
one regulatory relationship and entrance into another. So understood,
in terms of governmental action, Ruhl and Salzman’s concept of exit
essentially covers any regulatory action that alters some entity’s (often
many entities’) legal rights or obligations. And as any student of
administrative law knows, much of that subject is devoted to the
procedures that entities must follow when taking regulatory action and
judicial review of such action.
For example, a regulator often initiates exit via an adjudicatory
11. David Nakamura, Trump Administration Announces End of Immigration Protection for
‘Dreamers,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2017/09/05/trump-administration-announces-end-of-immigration-protectionprogram-for-dreamers/?utm_term=.3a6d331e9fbd [http://perma.cc/D8VT-HTC3]; see also U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM ON RESCISSION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR
CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS
(DACA)
(Sept.
5,
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca
[http://perma.cc/3E3D6ZQP] [hereinafter DACA Rescission Memo].
12. After the termination of DACA, lawsuits were filed challenging the Trump
administration’s action to terminate the program. Multiple district court judges granted
preliminary injunctions requiring the government to maintain the DACA program. See Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting
a preliminary injunction requiring the federal government to maintain DACA and allow
individuals to submit applications to renew their enrollment in DACA); see also Vidal v. Nielsen,
279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (granting a preliminary injunction requiring the government
to accept DACA applications from people who previously had DACA); Elizabeth Redden,
DACA Lives, but for How Long?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.inside
highered.com/news/2018/03/05/daca-continues-now-colleges-and-students-face-uncertainties
[http://perma.cc/ZW7H-9MHM].
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proceeding evaluating whether a private entity has satisfied ex ante
established regulatory criteria, or whether changed circumstances
render an entity no longer subject to regulation. The regulator looks at
past conduct to determine the rights and obligations of the entity under
the program that the regulator administers.13 Under the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), if the statute authorizing
regulatory action calls for a hearing and a decision based on the record
thereby created, the regulatory hearing must follow the formal trialtype procedures laid out in the APA.14 If the authorizing statute does
not call for a hearing on the record, the APA requires minimal
procedures,15 although the authorizing statute itself might specify
procedures above those the APA requires for such informal
adjudication.
If the agency initiates exit by prospectively eliminating or
modifying a program—and in the process changes the legal rights and
obligations of regulated entities—then the agency usually acts through
rulemaking.16 As for adjudication, the APA requires trial-type
procedures when the statute authorizing the rulemaking requires the
agency to hold a hearing and base the resulting rule on the hearing
record,17 although today statutes calling for such formal rulemaking are
unusual. More frequently, the agency must provide a notice of
proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for interested persons to
comment on the proposal before adopting a final rule.
Crucially, almost all agency action, whether based on evaluation
of ex ante criteria or changing those criteria ex post, is subject to
judicial review to ensure that the agency followed proper procedures,
acted within its statutory authority, and did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously.18 Significantly, courts have molded the arbitrary and

13. Under the APA, any retrospective agency action that applies, rather than creates,
standards is adjudication. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C §§ 551 (4), (6)–(7) (defining
adjudication as “the process for the formulation of an order,” which in turn is any action other
than a rule, which is any agency “statement of . . . future effect designed to implement, interpret
or prescribe law or policy”).
14. Id. § 554(a).
15. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655–56 (1990); see also Finer
Foods, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 274 F.3d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a statute
calling for a hearing triggered informal adjudication under the APA, but nonetheless entitling the
petitioner to some hearing before a neutral decisionmaker under the statute).
16. See 5 U.S.C §§ 551 (4)–(5).
17. Id. § 553(c).
18. There is a presumption that agency action is reviewable, although the action must be
ripe for review, and usually final, before a court will review it. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Abbott Labs.
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capricious standard into a process-oriented review, requiring the
agency to clearly set out the factual predicates for its action, and to
explain the implications of its action—the trade-offs between that
action and alternatives, including the alternative of doing nothing.19 In
addition, courts have structured review of agencies’ interpretation of
their statutory authority to require an inquiry similar to Chevron steptwo analysis.20
One might wonder what procedures and judicial review have to do
with Ruhl and Salzman’s call for consideration of exit criteria. Judicial
review does not undercut the importance of their call for agencies to
consider substantive criteria for ending or modifying programs;
however, judicial review does provide an important backstop to agency
exit decisions. Even when factors are relatively transparent and
specified ex ante, there may be uncertainty about precisely what they
entail, or about how an agency should best apply them. Hence, even
for this determinate category of exit, there is bound to be some
discretion in how an agency ultimately evaluates whether exit is
appropriate and what that exit should entail. Given the necessary
uncertainty surrounding the relationship between exit decisions and
regulatory goals, the public interest requires use of agency expertise
and decisionmaking structures that emphasize deliberation rather than
political decisionmaking.21 The need for explicit deliberation becomes
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967).
19. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–52 (1983). The
current approach to judicial review is predicated on the idea that the courts must ensure that the
agency took a hard look at all matters relevant to the action under review. See Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851–53 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (creating the hard look test); see
also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (demanding under arbitrary
and capricious review that an agency consider all “relevant factors”); see also Seidenfeld, supra
note 8, at 155–57 (describing how arbitrary and capricious review requires the agency to identify
the trade-offs inherent in its action).
20. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) (suggesting in dicta that State
Farm’s arbitrary and capricious standard and Chevron step-two analysis are “the same”);
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015) (holding that the EPA’s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act’s provisions governing regulation of existing power plants to allow the EPA to
ignore the costs of regulation was unreasonable under step two of Chevron); see also Kent Barnett
& Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–10, 33–45 (2017);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2390–91
(2018); Mark Seidenfeld, Revisiting Congressional Delegation of Interpretive Primacy as the
Foundation for Chevron Deference, 25 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at *22–
24) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
21. Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law,
97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852, 885–896 (2012); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Foreword to the Annual
Review of Administrative Law: The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative
State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1444–1457 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, The Role of
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even greater when the factors that bear on the exit decision are not
known ex ante, and when the manner of weighing those factors cannot
be established in a predetermined—and therefore transparent—
fashion. In addition, value judgments about what kind of exit, if any, is
best for society often attach to exit decisions. Although such value
judgments usually fall within the ambit of politics rather than law,
judicial review can help ensure that an agency does not hide these value
judgments behind faulty factual determinations and predictions;
judicial review, therefore, facilitates political accountability for exit
decisions.22
II. PROCESSES AS A CONSTRAINT ON PRESIDENTIAL EXIT
Before addressing process as a constraint on presidential exit, it is
important to clarify just what I, along with Professors Ruhl and
Salzman, mean by presidential exit. The past few presidents have
issued numerous regulatory executive orders. These often reverse
actions of the prior administration, and hence constitute exit under
Ruhl and Salzman’s definition.23 Many of these orders, however, are
instructions to executive officials to implement regulatory programs as
the president dictates. The president, as the coordinator of the
executive branch, can certainly issue such instructions, but the most
widely held view—and the view to which presidential conduct has
conformed—is that the president does not have inherent power as head
of the executive branch to dictate actions to officials that Congress has
authorized to act.24 Under this understanding of the president’s
Politics].
22. See Seidenfeld, Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 8, at 144, 163–64.
23. See Ruhl & Salzman, Presidential Exit, supra note 4, at 1738–39.
24. Scholars who argue that the Constitution created a unitary executive headed by the
president, contend that the president has authority to make all decisions left to the executive
branch. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE. L.J. 541, 596 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The
Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–94 (1993). However,
the traditional view sees the constitutional role of the president as overseer—not decider—of
administrative policy that has been delegated by statute to an agency official. See Kevin M. Stack,
The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006);
Peter Strauss, Foreword: Overseer or “the Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704–05 (2007). But see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2249–53 (2001) (arguing against the unitary executive position as a matter
of constitutional law, but arguing that statutes allow the president to direct agency decisions
whenever the decisionmaker is removable at will by the president); Kathryn Watts, Controlling
Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 728 (2016) (stating that the Supreme Court has not
answered the question: “when can the president step into the shoes of the agency and make a
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constitutional power, a congressionally authorized official need not
heed the president’s instructions if she is willing to pay the price of
ignoring them.25 If, as usually occurs, the official does comply with the
president’s instructions, then it is the official’s action—not the
president’s instruction—that has the force of law; the processes
dictated for regulatory action then apply to the official’s action.
For example, in September 2017 the media reported that
President Trump reversed the Obama administration’s DACA
program.26 In actuality, DACA was created by an exercise of
enforcement discretion granted by statute to the secretary of homeland
security, and not by President Obama. Similarly, the DACA
termination was implemented by a memorandum issued by the acting
secretary of homeland security, and not by an action of President
Trump.27 The memorandum constitutes a general statement of policy,
which as an agency—as opposed to a presidential—action is subject to
judicial review. Given that such constraints already exist for
presidential decisions that have to be implemented by agency action, I
will limit my discussion, as Ruhl and Salzman do, to presidential orders
decision that Congress delegated to a specified agency official?”). Even when President Richard
Nixon wanted to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox during the Watergate investigation, he
did not do so directly. Nixon instead asked the person acting as attorney general to do so. This
resulted in Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William
Ruckelshaus resigning rather than following the president’s order, and Cox remained in his
position until he was fired by Solicitor General Robert Bork, who became acting attorney general
upon the resignations of Richardson and Ruckelshaus.
25. If the matter is of sufficient importance to the president, and if he has the power to do
so, presumably the president will fire the official for ignoring his instructions. Another potential
cost of ignoring presidential will is reduction of White House support for programs headed by the
official, which is likely to result in loss of funding for such programs. Kirti Datla & Richard L.
Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV.
769, 822–824 (2013); Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 594 (1984) (“The commissions need goods the
president can provide: budgetary and legislative support, assistance in dealing with other agencies,
legal services, office space, and advice on national policy.”). Of course, the president may also
pay a price for exacting a price from the official, for example, the loss of an effective member of
the president’s administration or a decrease in funding for programs the president supports. See
Strauss, supra, at 589–91; see also Kagan, supra note 24, at 2274 (“[T]he president often cannot
make effective use of his removal power given the political costs of doing so.”).
26. Tal Kopan, Trump Ends DACA but Gives Congress Window To Save It, CNN (Sept. 5,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/05/politics/daca-trump-congress/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9W8S-8D4D]; Veronica Stracqualursi & Adam Kelsey, Trump Administration
Announces Plan To End DACA, ABC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
trump-expected-announce-daca-decision-today/story?id=49611829
[https://perma.cc/97AP2XAB]; Anthony Zurcher, Trump’s DACA Dilemma- and Dodge, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41153609 [https://perma.cc/AT4G-FZV5].
27. DACA Rescission Memo, supra note 11.
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that have direct force of law.
Having clarified what constitutes presidential exit, let me proceed
to address why the benefits of procedure and judicial review attach to
presidential action. From a deliberative democratic perspective,
procedures help ensure that the decisionmaker, whether agency or
president, receives and considers relevant stakeholder input.28 Judicial
review, properly structured, ensures that the decisionmaker takes
care;29 it also restrains the decisionmaker from creatively spinning facts
to essentially mislead the public about the implications of its action.30
To be sure, the president has different strengths and incentives
than do agencies. The costs of procedure and judicial review may be
greater for presidential action than for agency action. Presidents may
have to act so quickly that there is not time for procedures prior to their
decisionmaking. The president may also have a greater need to keep
deliberations confidential to protect national security. The potential
for delay caused by procedures and judicial review, therefore, may
render them inappropriate for a greater percentage of presidential
action than agency action. The benefits of procedure and judicial
review may also be less for presidential action than for agency action.
Unlike agency heads, the president is a political being who is directly
accountable to the people. Accordingly, the White House is
structurally more attuned to popular reaction to presidential action
than are agencies with respect to agency action.31
At the same time, the president’s political outlook is likely to
28. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1559–62, 1572–76 (1992); see also Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:
Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448–49 (2010);
Staszewski, supra note 21, at 885–893.
29. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002)
30. See Seidenfeld, Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 8, at 144, 177–79. I am not alone in
looking for process-based constraints on presidential control of regulation. See, e.g., Nina A.
Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127,
1130–31 (2010); Watts, supra note 24, at 740–45. The proposals by Watts and Mendelson address
presidential influence on agency action already subject to procedural constraints and judicial
review, and hence cannot control direct regulatory actions by the president. In addition, I have
explained why disclosure of White House interaction with agencies and crediting judicial review
is unlikely to constrain, and may even exacerbate, problematic presidential influence. See
Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics, supra note 21, at 1454–57. President Trump’s tweets, by which
he directly communicates with the public, have strengthened my conviction that disclosure of the
president’s position on regulatory matters will not constrain politically motivated decisions that
undermine the public interest.
31. See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2335; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L REV. 469, 507–08 (1985).
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encourage him to view data and predicted effects of his actions in a
light most favorable to his action and to spin the action accordingly.
Established procedures can provide a reliable record to counter
questionable presidential factual assertions, and judicial review can
provide an objective analysis of that record. The phenomenon of White
House spin, which today rises to the level of the Trump White House
alleging “fake news,”32 suggests that procedures and judicial review for
presidential action may provide huge returns in increased quality of
presidential decisionmaking. Thus, while courts might need to massage
the availability and perhaps the precise structure of hard look review
to make it work for presidential exit, some version of such review does
promise potentially enormous benefits.
Returning to the termination of DACA example, a district court
reversed the “Trump” change in DACA, which the acting secretary
had premised on the unlawfulness of the creation of the program in the
first place.33 The judge ruled that the secretary of homeland security
had authority to create the program, and therefore that the justification
given by the assistant secretary was inadequate. The ultimate result, if
the district court ruling stands, is that the Trump administration will
either acquiesce in continuing DACA, or it must justify ending the
program as a policy matter. In essence, if President Trump ends
DACA, he will have to take responsibility for that action as a matter
of policy; that would be at odds with his public position that he favors
DACA but thinks that Congress must authorize it for it to be lawful.34
Although judicial review was available because the secretary of
homeland security, rather than the president, had the authority to take
this action, the termination of DACA illustrates how process-based
constraints on exit can help the electorate hold the president politically
32. Steve Coll, Donald Trump’s “Fake News” Tactics, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/11/donald-trumps-fake-news-tactics
[http://
perma.cc/K2CF-LEXE]; see also Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 7, 2018,
12:35 P.M.) (“The Fake News Awards, those going to the most corrupt & biased Mainstream
Media, will be presented to the losers on Wednesday, January 17th . . . .”), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/950103659337134080?lang=en [https://perma.cc/24NC-TN7Z].
33. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D.
Cal. 2018); see also Aubree Eliza Weaver, Trump Calls Courts ‘Broken’ After Judge Blocks
DACA Wind-down, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/10/judgedaca-ruling-trump-response-333153[https://perma.cc/X7BL-MHKY].
34. Katie Reilly, Here’s What President Trump Has Said About DACA in the Past, TIME
(Sept. 5, 2017), http://time.com/4927100/donald-trump-daca-past-statements/ [https://perma.cc/
7VSW-EA3W]; see also Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves To End DACA
and Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/G75R-rUXH].
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accountable for his actions.
Although procedures and judicial review would undoubtedly
encourage more deliberative—and therefore, I believe, wiser—
presidential exit, the extent to which Congress and the courts can
impose such process-based constraints may be severely limited. In
particular, the ability to impose such constraints depends on whether
the president is exercising statutorily granted authority when he
demands exit from a regulatory program, or instead authority
stemming from his inherent Article II constitutional powers. In the
context of the administrative state, Vermont Yankee holds that it is
inappropriate for courts to impose procedures on agency action
beyond those required by statutory or constitutional law. This is usually
sound policy because courts do not have the expertise to structure
procedure for the vast array of contexts within which agencies act.
They may well overestimate the benefits of procedures and fail to
appreciate the burdens procedures impose. Moreover, procedures may
be inextricable from outcomes; procedural burdens would increase the
cost of action and thereby reduce or even preclude certain presidential
action.35 Courts have, of course, added to the minimal requirements of
APA rulemaking by requiring that notice of a proposed rule allow for
meaningful comment,36 and by creating the hard look doctrine of
judicial review.37 But they have done so to implement the purposes
underlying specific provisions in the APA and agency organic statutes
that provide for notice-and-comment and arbitrary and capricious
judicial review. Thus, courts are not creating burdens out of whole
cloth. The question is whether courts can find similar pegs on which to
hang required procedures and review for presidential exit.
Unfortunately, I can find no such pegs in the Constitution itself.
While it specifies a precise procedure for enacting statutes and imposes
due process as a constraint on judicial procedure, the Constitution is
completely silent on procedure for actions by the president. Therefore,
when the president acts pursuant to direct authority in the

35. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 404–08 (noting that Congress may impose procedures to bias
agency action toward certain outcomes).
36. See Peter Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 497, 520 (2013) (“[For the past four decades] judges have understood the statutory
requirement to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register also to require
agencies simultaneously to release important materials on which the proposal relies”).
37. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 128 & n.239 (1994).
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Constitution—such as when he manages the operations of the
executive branch in the absence of statutory direction,38 or when he acts
in his role as the commander in chief of the military—there does not
seem to be a solid legal ground for imposing procedures or judicial
review on such action.
The propriety of process-based constraints improves, I believe,
when the president acts pursuant to a statutory delegation from
Congress because statutes can prescribe procedures and judicial review
on presidential action. Some might find this belief unremarkable
because if Congress can withhold the power from the president
entirely, it seems logical that Congress should be able to condition the
exercise of that power however it sees fit. This does not necessarily
follow.39 If one views creation of law, which is at the core of the
legislative power, as entirely distinct from the execution of the law,
then one might argue that Congress oversteps its bounds if it constrains
the head of the executive branch in implementing of the law. Virtually
no one doubts the validity of statutorily created procedures and judicial
review of agency action. There is a difference, however, between
appointed agency officials—whose institutional existence depends on
the agency organic statute—and the elected president, in whom “the
executive Power [is] vested.”40
The distinction between creation and execution of the law,
however, is not well defined, and drawing the line between the two
types of action is impossible so long as one recognizes that execution
of the law necessarily involves policymaking discretion. Jurists and
scholars alike have relied on the difficulty of distinguishing execution
from creation of law to justify the current moribund state of the
nondelegation doctrine.41 When a statute specifies the process by which

38. If Congress either lacks power over a matter or simply has not exercised its power, then
the president’s action on the matter is pursuant to his powers under Article II of the Constitution.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (noting that the president may have power to take actions to execute statutory law in
the face of congressional silence regarding such implementation).
39. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–41 (1985) (holding that state
discretion to create a property interest does not allow the state to restrict procedures to which a
property owner is entitled by the due process clause of the Constitution).
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
41. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (explaining why
courts defer to legislative judgments about how much policy making can be left as part of the
execution of a statute). See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) (describing various justifications for the
nondelegation doctrine but concluding that the doctrine cannot be supported).
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the executive branch is to implement and enforce law, those statutory
instructions could reach the point of being sufficiently “executive” to
constitute interference with the execution of the law; this question is
the inverse of that posed by the nondelegation doctrine. And the line
between legislation and execution of law is no easier to draw in this
context. This is especially so given that the Constitution explicitly
grants Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [legislative]
Powers . . . .”42 Thus, courts have routinely held that statutes can
constrain prosecutorial discretion by specifying priorities in
prosecuting various types of statutory violations.
A staunch formalist might contend, nonetheless, that specifying
procedures and providing for judicial review of presidential
administration of statutes interferes with value judgments regarding
execution of statutes that are appropriately left to the popularly
accountable president. Value judgments are clearly relevant to such
decisions as how to balance the benefits and costs of procedures, and
how intensely to prosecute various types of statutory violations. The
Necessary and Proper Clause, however, suggests that Congress, whose
members are also elected by the people, has authority to interfere with
executive value judgments in order to effectuate the execution of the
laws it creates.43 This justifies my belief that Congress can impose
process-based constraints on presidential exit. And if Congress agrees
with me that process is important to ensure that the president makes
exit decisions carefully and accountably, it would do well to specify
procedures and judicial review when authorizing the president to
implement a statute directly.
CONCLUSION
Ruhl and Salzman’s insight that the regulatory state should pay
more attention to the substantive criteria for exit from relationships
between regulators and regulated entities is pathbreaking. Yet the
uncertainties surrounding regulation—whether due to unknown future
developments or simply the complexity of regulation at work—makes
specification of substantive exit criteria difficult. This Essay points out
that the administrative state has reacted to this difficulty by creating
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
43. Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2088 (2002) (arguing that Congress does not encroach on judicial power by specifying
the means by which courts are to interpret statutes).

1788

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1775

process-based “backups” for determining exit criteria, such as
procedures and judicial review. Unfortunately, it has not done so for
direct regulatory action by the president. When the president
predicates such action on direct constitutional authority, the
Constitution provides no peg on which courts can “hang” processbased constraints. However, when the president acts pursuant to
statutory delegation of regulatory authority, this Essay suggests that
Congress can and should provide process constraints such as
procedures for and judicial review of such actions.

